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Noel D. Campbell* 
University of Central Arkansas 
Edward J. Lopez 
San Jose State University 
Tammy M. Rogers 
University of Central Arkansas 
Lopez and Campbell (2004) find a statistically significant, positive re-
lationship between incumbents ' deviations from their constituents' pre -
ferences and incumbents subsequent campaign expenditures. We 
replicate their empirical program using a different measure of incum-
bent deviation based on Berry, Ringquist , Fording, and Hanson (1998). 
Using both measures of incumbents ' deviations we both confirm and 
disconfir m the Lopez and Campbell result, implying either the construct 
of incumbents' deviations from constituents ' interests or its operationa-
lization is underdeveloped . 
INTRODUCTION 
Lopez and Campbell (2004) examine the empirical rela-tionship between vote score residuals and incumbents' campaign expenditures in the subsequent re-election bid . 
The incumbent's goal is to get re-elected. The literature on legis-
lator voting has consistently shown that deviating from constitu-
• Corresponding author . 
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ents' preferred policies makes this objective more difficult 
(Bender and Lott, 1996). Despite this, an incumbent may occa-
sionally deviate from constituents' preferences with good reason 
(to pursue personal views, to service interest group pressure, to 
demonstrate loyalty to party leaders, etc.). To deviate while di-
minishing the costs of deviating, incumbents rriay increase their 
campaign expenditures in an effort to convince constituents to 
vote for them regardless of their policy positions. This interpreta-
tion of re-election expenditures has been termed "persuasive" 
campaigning (Mueller and Stratrnann, 1994). If we view con-
gressional seats as an economic good and re-election expendi-
tures as the unit price paid by an incumbent for the good, then 
incumbents may "buy" some deviation, in the form of dimi-
nished electoral punishment, by expending more in their re-
election bids. Lopez and Campbell (2004) find a statistically sig-
nificant positive empirical relationship between incumbents' 
deviations and their subsequent campaign expenditures for the 
1992 through 1998 Congressional elections, indicating persua-
sive campaign expenditures. 
However, to derive their measure of incumbent deviation, 
Lopez and Campbell rely on the widely used but still controver-
sial "residualization" procedure pioneered by Kau and Rubin 
(1979). This paper seeks to replicate the empirical program of 
Lopez and Campbell without recourse to the controversial empir-
ical technique by using a different literature to derive a different 
measure of incumbent deviation. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and 
Hanson (1998) present a framework for producing an alternative 
measure on congresspersons' ideology based on interest group 
ratings of congresspersons (like the Kau and Rubin measure) and 
election results. Using a method similar to that of Berry, et al., 
we produce an alternative measure of incumbents' deviations 
from electorate wishes. 
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Using our new measure of incumbents' deviation from con-
stituents' interests, we replicate the Lopez and Campbell empiri-
cal procedure. Contrary to the findings of Campbell and Lopez 
(2004), we find that our measure of incumbent deviations is not 
significantly related to incumbents' re-election expenditures. 
However, we find that more incumbent deviation significantly 
predicts lower vote margins for the incumbent and lower oppo-
nent's expenditures in the incumbent's subsequent re-election 
bid. Taken together, these findings imply that incumbent devia-
tion does matter, as implied by Bender and Lott (1996). Further-
more, the incumbent is not able to "buy back'' some of his 
deviation in a subsequent election bid. Rather, the electorate re-
wards the challenger with higher voter support regardless of in-
cumbent expenditure. 
However, closer inspection of our results is not as injurious 
to Lopez and Campbell (2004) as first inspection might indicate. 
Despite the proposition that Lopez and Campbell's deviation 
variable and our current deviation variable measure the same 
phenomena, and despite the shared derivation of both meas-
ures-adjusted ADA scores for incumbents-the two variables 
have a low correlation coefficient of 0.049. Furthermore, models 
applying both deviation variables both reconfirms the main Lo-
pez and Campbell (2004) result and reconfirms this study's re-
sult. These findings imply to us that either the construct of 
incumbent deviations from constituent's purported interests, or 
the operationalization of the construct, is underdeveloped. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 
two considers background theoretical issues, section three 
presents the empirical results, while section four discusses and 
concludes. 
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Like Lopez and Campbell, we focus on the idea that deviat-
ing from the median voter's ideal point, toward the legislator's 
own ideal point, is presumably of some value to the legislator. 
We are most interested in whether the incumbent perceives such 
deviations as making his re-election efforts more difficult. The 
literature on congressional voting is nearly unanimous in show-
ing that when legislators do deviate from constituents, they are 
punished fairly quickly at the voting booth. 1 Considering these 
findings, we ask whether incumbents who deviate more tend to 
"buy back" the resultant electoral losses by spending more in 
their re-election bid. 
Consider the problem in a simple price-theoretic model. If a 
legislator values movement away from Mki, the median voter's 
preferred policy position for district k in time t, toward L1ct,, the 
legislator's preferred policy position in district k at time t, then 
µkt = I Lkt - Mkt I, the absolute policy deviation, would be one 
argument in a legislator's demand function for his congressional 
seat. If we hold other arguments constant, we may define 
qk [p(µkt )] as the~ legislator's non-negative demand for a con-
gressional seat. The argument (p) indicates the unit price paid to 
win re-election; that is, the incumbent's re-election campaign 
expenditures. The "price" is a function of the degree of devia-
tion. If this price-theoretic view is an accurate representation of 
the incumbent's re-election calculus, we expect greater deviation 
1 Wright (1993) finds that legislators who diverge from constituent preferences lose an 
average of five percentage points in political support as indicated by primary elections . 
Lott and Davis (1992) find a significant correlation between shirking and defeat in subse-
quent election , and Lott and Bronars (1993) show that the House members who lost their 
reelection bids shirked more in the prior term as a group than those who won reelection. 
Finally, Kau, and Rubin (1993) argue that insofar as ideological shirking exists , it is 
costly and punished quickly by the electoral process. For an extensive , critical survey of 
the shirking literature, see Bender and Lott (I 996) . 
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to increase the unit price paid for the seat, ceteris paribus. Tiiat 
is, op/6µ > 0. 
The now common, yet controversial, technique for isolating 
incumbents' deviations began with Kau and Rubin (1979) and 
Kalt and Zupan (1984, 1990). These authors were originally con-
cerned with developing a proxy for legislator ideology and esti-
mating the explanatory power of that proxy in a model of 
legislator voting. The subsequent empirical literature developed 
along multiple margins: whether residuals measure ideology or 
shirking or both, whether legislators shirk, the conditions under 
which they will shirk more or less, whether and to what extent 
constituents punish shirking, etc. Many of these contributions 
use some variation of Kau and Rubin's (1979) measure of devia-
tion from constituent interests: the extent to which the legisla-
tor's vote record is unexplained by measures of constituent 
economic interests. Bender and Lott (1996) provide a useful sur-
vey of this large literature. 
However, the technique came under immediate criticism in 
the same literature. The econometric critiques include under-
specification of the relevant economic interests of the k congres-
sional districts (Peltzman, 1984; 1985), and omitted variables 
bias and endogeneity bias on parameter estimates (Jackson and 
Kingdon, 1992). It is reasonably clear that Kau and Rubin 
(1979), in some sense, attempts to explain .votes with votes. Fur-
thermore, to attach a specific interpretation to a residual, an un-
observable, seems to require an intellectual leap. 2 
Though Lopez and Campbe_ll (2004) modeled incumbents' 
deviations in the Kau and Rubin (1979) manner, we avoid the 
problems raised in that literature by calculating deviations from 
perceived constituent interests by using a different measure. Fur-
thermore, we avoid the "votes with votes" criticism by modeling 
2 Other criticisms are discussed with detail in Bender and Lott (1996). 
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expenditures instead of current votes, as did Lopez and Camp-
bell. 
Our measure of incumbent deviation is based on Berry, et al. 
(1998), which constructed "dynamic measures of the ideology of 
a state's citizens and political leaders, using roll call voting 
scores of &tate congressional delegations, the outcomes of con-
gressional elections, the partisan division of state legisla-
tors ... and various assumptions regarding voters and state 
political elites." (Berry, et al., 1998:327). They identify two 
"critical" concepts in the literature: "[S]tate citizen ideology, 
generally conceived as the mean position on a liberal-
conservative continuum of the ' active electorate' in a state;" and 
"[S]tate government ideolog;-the mean position on the same 
continuum of the elected public officials in a state, weighted ac-
cording to the power they have over public policy decisions" 
(Berry, et al., 1998:327-328). To measure state citizen and gov-
ernment ideology, they develop "measures based on interest 
group ratings of members of Congress, supplemented by two 
other sources of information: election returns for Congressional 
races, and data on the party composition of state legislatures and 
party affiliation of governors" (Berry, et al., 1998:329). 
The authors identify the "ideological" position of each 
member of Congress using an average of ADA and COPE 
scores. Subsequently, they estimate citizen ideology (CITIDEO) 
in each district of a state using the incumbent's ideology score, a 
challenger's estimated ideology score, and the election returns 
for that race. Thus: 
(1) INCIDEOd,t = INCSUPd,t 
(/NCIDEOd,t) + (CHALSUOd,i)(CHALIDEOd,t) 
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Where INCIDEO is the incumbent's "ideology" score and IN-
CSUP is his/her percentage of the popular vote. CHALSUP is the 
challenger's vote percentage. CHALIDEO is "equal to the aver-
age ideology score of all incumbents in the state from the same 
party" as the challenger (Berry, et al., 1998:331). That is, CHA-
LIDEO is the mean of the means of ADA/COPE scores each of 
Congressional representative from the challenger's party. The 
authors justify their CHALIDEO construction by assuming "vot-
ers perceive the ideological position of a challenger to resemble 
the typical ideological position of incumbents from the same par-
ty in the same state" (Berry, et al., 1998:338). As a possible ex-
ample, challengers who emerge from a party's primary process 
are expected to offer positions close to those of their party's in-
cumbent office holders, under standard median voter assump-
tions. 
Thus, our measure of incumbent deviation from the median 
constituent preference is 
(2) (ABSDEVIATEd,t) = I INCIDEOd,t - CITIDEOd,t I-
That is 
(3) ABSDEVIATEd ,t 
= l(CHALSUPd,t)(JNCIDEOd ,t - CHALIDEOd,t) I-
Lopez and Campbell find their measure of incumbents' devia -
tions to be a significantly positive predictor of incumbents' 
spending in subsequent re-election efforts. Likewise, we expect 
our measure of incumbents' deviation, ABSDEVIATE, to be a 
significantly positive predictor of incumbent campaign expendi-
tures. 
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EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
Our data set contains vote records, campaign information, 
and legislator characteristics for all 1,511 House incumbents 
seeking re-election in 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998.3 We also ob-
serve constituent interest variables for each of these incumbents' 
districts in each year. The vote record is provided by the annual 
ADA score, which measures the frequency on a { 0-100} scale of 
a legislator voting consistently with the ADA's position on a set 
of key votes during the year. The ADA selects the votes each 
year and takes a position on each vote that is easily identifiable 
as liberal, so a higher ADA score indicates a more liberal voting 
record. The campaign spending data are from Federal Election 
Commission databases (FEC 2002),4 while the legislator-specific 
variables come from the Almanac of American Politics (Barone 
and Ujifusa 1994-2000). Constituent and/or district variables 
come from 1990 Census data. Table 1 lists all variables used in 
this study, with definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics. 
We would prefer to use panel estimation methods, but many 
of our independent variables are taken from 1990 Census data 
3 One reader suggested our sample may systematically exclude observations, thus intro-
ducing sample selection bias . This can take two possible forms, either by excluding chal-
lengers or by excluding incumbents who did not run for re-election . Only incumbents 
know the true value of in-office deviation from constituent interests and have accurate 
knowledge of the appropriate price to pay for it. Likewise, only incumbents are able to 
amass a voting record through vote indices, an opportunity denied to challengers . Still, 
challengers are effectively included in the model through the variable OPPSPEND, dis-
cussed presently in the text. Evidence from Van Beek (1991) and Lott (1987) suggests 
retiring members do not exhibit systematically different voting records, although they do 
vote less frequently. Based on this evidence, we do not expect significant bias from our 
selected sample. In any case, there is no effective way to incorporate retirees into our 
model of re-election . Their vote score residuals during their last period of office go unex-
plained by our present model. See Lott (1990), Zupan (1990), and Carey (1994) for em-
pirical analyses of shirking and the last period problem . 
' Files used in this study include cansurn92 .zip, cansum94 .zip, cansurn96 .zip, and can-
sum98 .zip. 
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T abl e 1 
Variable Na me s, Defin ition s, Source s, & De scri{!tive Statistics 
Descri ption (Source) 
TOTSPEND Incumbent Campaign Expendi-
tures1 
ABSDEVIA TE Absolute% deviation from 
constituents 
OPPSPEND Challenger Campaign Expendi-
turesl 
VOTEMARG Incumbent less challenger vote 
share1 
TENURE Incumbent years in office2 
GENDER = I if incumbent female2 
MAJP ARTY =I incumbent Democrar 
HHIE Economic Concentration (authors' cal-
culations}4 
PCTBLACK Constituents' raceJ 
PCTCOLLG Constituents' education3 
PUBEMP% QUblic emQio:rees 
MEDJNC Constituents' income3 
CHBEGIN Challenger beginning cash 1 
CH CORP Challenger corporate contnbutions1 
CHLABOR Challenger labor contributions1 
OPENPRIMARY = I open or blanket primary 
(West!~ et al. 2004} 
PEROT92 % voting Perot 19922 
WINNER =! iflncumbentwins 
1 Federal Election Commission (various years). 
2Barone and Uj ifusa (various years). 
' United States Census Buread (various years). 
Unifs Mean SD Mm Max 
$HID; 582.8 436.9 6.6 65413 
Peron 54.9 43.1 0.0 950.7 
$l<m 184.7 301.l 0.0 33259 
Peron 33.l 255 -100.0 100.0 
Years 95 7.7 51.0 
{0,1} 0.1 03 0.0 1.0 
{0,1} .6 05 0.0 1.0 
{0-0,000} 200.0 48.9 76.7 3813 
Peron 11.8 15.9 0.0 73.9 
Percent 183 6.6 53 483 
Percent 22 12 0.63 112 
$1,<m 30.9 83 15.05 572 
$1,<m 35 30.0 0 670.9 
$1,<m 7.7 26.0 -05 3962 
$1,<m 15.7 40.0 -1.0 23 
{0,1} 05 05 0.0 1.0 
Percent 183 6.0 3 33 
{0,1} 0.9 02 0 
4HHlE is a Herfindahl-Hirscbman index on U.S. Census data for employment in seventeen indus-
tries. The higher the index, the more concentrated is the employment in certain industries, indicat-
ing more concentrated economic interests and greater political effectiveness in the district, ceteris 
paribus. HHIE varies by district from a low of77 (New York, 16") to a high of381 (California, 
I 5ft). The former occupies most of the Bronx and is the most economically diver.;e district in the 
country according to this index. The southeastern part of Kentucky is similarly diverse, scoring a 
mere 80 HHIE. The latter is California's Silicon Valley around the city of San Jose, a presumably 
economically concentrated region. Similarly, Virginia's 8111 District around the Pentagon in Arling-
ton scores a 363, and New York's 14111 District, the east side of Manhattan, scores a 360. 
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and do not vary over our sample years. Therefore we treat the 
data as a pool of four cross-sections over time, and we use both 
year and state dummies to capture possible intercept effects. 
Our first step is to obtain the measure of incumbents' devia-
tion, based on the measures of Berry, et al. (1998). Rather than 
average ADA and COPE scores, we exclusively use the ADA 
score. Berry, et al., make no apparent correction for "drift" in 
ADA scores overtime. Such drift occurs because the vote scores 
are calculated each year on a set of votes unique for that year. As 
identical bills under identical circumstances do not present every 
year, a correction must be made to ADA scores to allow cross-
year comparisons. Since we are making intertemporal compari-
sons of ADA scores, while the set of votes used to assign ADA 
scores is not constant over time, we have adjusted the raw ADA 
scores using the linear transformation method from Groseclose, 
Levitt, and Snyder (1999). If the /!' legislator's raw ADA score 
in year t is Y1a then the adjusted ADA score is Y1a = (y1a-a,)!b, 
where a, and b, are maximum likelihood parameter estimates 
from Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999). The a, and b, esti-
mates provide an index for converting raw ADA scores in any 
year to adjusted ADA scores for that year-similar to how a 
price index is used to convert nominal to real economic va-
riables.5 CITIDEO, CHALIDEO, and ABSDEVIATE are calcu-
lated according to the text. As discussed earlier, we are interested 
only in the degree of deviation, not the direction. Therefore we 
convert these differences to their absolute values and assign the 
5 For example, Representative Herb Callahan (Alabama, District I) shows a raw ADA 
score of 5 in 1992. For the House, al992 = 7.27 and b1992 = 0.97, so the adjusted ADA 
score is -2.34. This reflects a liberal shift of the scale in 1992 relative to other years, so 
that a score .of 5 understates the conservativeness of Rep. Callahan's 1992 vote record, 
which is more accurately reflected in the score of -2 .34. An up to date list of at and bl 
estimates is provided on Tim Groseclose' s website at Stanford University (http://faculty-
gsb.stanford.edu/groseclose/archive.htrn at the time of this writing). 
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variable name ABSDEVIATE, which is our explanatory variable 
of primary interest in the next estimation. 
Our next step is to estin1ate the incumbent expenditures equ-
ation . There is a well-known simultaneity problem in models of 
campaign spending. With incumbent spending as the dependent 
variable, both challenger spending and margin of victory are 
theoretically significant variables. However, it is also expected 
that incumbent spending, challenger spending and the vote mar-
gin are endogenously determined. Intuitively, as a race becomes 
tighter and the challenger spends more, the incumbent will be 
motivated to spend more as well. At the same time, as the in-
cumbent spends more, he or she will increase the margin of vic-
tory, which may in turn compel the challenger to spend less. 
Therefore, we approach this problem using the following 
three-equation system: 
(4a)Ekt = Po+ /J1ABSDEVIATEkt + /J2Cflskt + {J3MARkt 
+ P1~kt + Ekt 
The subscripts k and t indicate congressional district and year, as 
before, and j indicates the /1' exogenous explanatory variable. 
Equations (4b) and (4c) are the reduced form expressions for the 
endogenous explanatory variables, namely challenger spending 
and margin of victory, respectively. Hence Zc and ZM are the in-
strumental variables (i.e. exclusion restrictions) used in the first 
stage equations. Following standard practice, we assume E(rc) = 
E(rM) = 0 and Cov(rc, c) = Cov(rM, c) = 0. We do not assume 
independence between re and rM. As with all 2SLS estimations 
the quality of Zc and ZM, which are subject to data limitations, 
VOL. 37 2008 
44 CAMPBELL, LOPEZ, & ROGERS 
determine the value of this correction procedure over OLS esti-
mates. We first describe the variables, then discuss the IV equa-
tions, and then proceed to the second stage results. 
The endogenous variables are 
• TOTSPEND: total expenditures by the incumbent; 
• OPPSPEND: total expenditures by the incumbent's 
foremost challenger; and 
• VOTEMARG: incumbent's vote share less the challen-
ger's vote share (this takes a negative value when the 
challenger wins). 
Our instrumental variables for OPPSPEND are 
• CHBEGfN: challenger's cash on hand at beginning of 
election campaign; 
• CHCORP: total corporate contributions to the challen-
ger; and 
• CHLABOR: total labor union contributions to the chal-
lenger. 
These variables represent the fundraising successes of the 
challenger. 
Our instrumental variables for VOTEMARG are measured 
as: 
• OPENPRIMARY: a binary variable coded 1 for states 
that allow open or blanket primary elections; 
• PEROT92: percent of a district's vote going to H. Ross 
Perot in the 1992 presidential election; and 
• WINNER: binary variable coded 1 for incumbent who is 
reelected. 
With these variables we attempt to measure effects on the 
margin of victory distinct from their having an effect on TOTS-
PEND. States with open/blanket primaries typically have more 
highly contested races. WINNER adds explanatory power, and 
we use Perot's vote share to proxy coattail effects. 
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Finally, in the exogenous Xj matrix we include a typical 
campaign-spending model with variables measured as: 
• MAJPARTY: binary variable coded "l" if the legislator is 
a member of the majority party, e.g., for Republicans it 
equals "O" in 1992 and 1994, but "1" in 1996 and 1998; 
• TENURE: number of years incumbent has been in the 
House; 
• GENDER: binary variable coded "l" if incumbent is fe-
male; 
• IIlIIE: a measure of economic concentration by district. 
See Table 1 for full explanation; 
• PCTBLACK: district race variable, as listed by the Cen-
sus Bureau; 
• PUBEMP: number of public employees in the district; 
• PCTCOLLG: percent of the district population with a col-
lege degree; and 
• ln(MEDINC): natural log of the district's median income. 
We present a variable correlation matrix in Table 2. 
We present model estimates in Table 3, treating the data as a 
pool of cross-sections over time. We include year dummies to 
capture intercept effects. The estimates correct for heteroskedas-
ticity and cluster the data by state. Our rationale in using state 
(not district) effects is that because state delegations work to-
gether in various capacities, and many campaign and elections 
laws are determined at the state level, we expect more of an ef-
fect across states than congressional districts. We report results 
treating both CHSPEND and VOTEMARG as endogenous. 
Instrumenting for opponent's spending in Model I, AB-
SDEVIATE was positively related to incumbents' re-election 
expenQitures, TOTSPEND, but the coefficient was insignificant. 
Instrumenting for vote margin in Model 2, ABSDEVIATE failed 
to approach any standard level of statistical significance. Even 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
c;,:, ~ 
~ E-< :>< ::0:: c;,:, g:; ~ i ~ t u ..J u ~ ~ ~ ~ g:; j ..J ~ ll. ll. ~ ~ < 0 Q ~ Cll Cll ~ Q ~ e; ~ u ; I E-< ll. E-< Cll ~ ti ti 0 ll. 0 ~ c;,:, ~ ~ ~ ll. E-< 0 ;;,. < E-< c;,:, ll. ll. Cll 
TOTSPEND 1.0 
OPPSPEND 0.291 1.0 
VOTEMARG -0.283 -0.507 1.0 
ABSDEVIATE 0.033 -0 .001 -0.151 1.0 
AGE -0.006 -0 .076 0.065 -0.035 1.0 
TENURE 0.074 -0 .137 0.069 -0 .031 0.545 1.0 
GENDER 0.018 0.101 0.017 -0.010 0.063 -0 .145 1.0 
MAJPARTY 0.101 0.036 -0.195 0.050 -0.044 -0.024 -0.038 1.0 
PCTBLACK -0.129 -0 .099 0.233 0.016 0.041 -0 .057 0.061 0.021 1.0 
PCYCOLLG 0.095 0.091 0.029 -0 .084 0.073 0.003 0.171 -0.057 -0.217 1.0 
BRIE 0.096 0.081 -0.062 -0.083 0.023 0.009 0.109 -0.029 -0.275 0.673 1.0 
InMEDINC 0.121 0.087 -0.032 -0.108 0.060 0.026 0.110 -0.057 -0.308 0.767 0.705 1.0 
SPENDVAR 0.005 -0 .043 0.039 0.025 0.021 0.004 -0.006 -0.029 -0.012 -0.028 -0 .038 -0.028 1.0 
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Table 3 
IV (2SLS) Regression with Robust Standard Errors 
Model I Model 2 Model3 
TOTSPEND TOTSPEND TOTSPEND 
OPPSPEND 0.39! 0.24 0.39j 
S.E. 0.11 0.15 0.15 
VOTEMARG -2648.86j -4780.09 -2802.36 
S.E. 1028.16 6054.25 2438.61 
ABSDEVIATE 235.26 105.16 224.40 
S.E. 155.75 372.14 181.59 
AGE -2512.67j -2487.86j -2505.95j 
S.E. 1209.65 1197.82 1/84 .91 
TENURE 8114.991 8078.41! 8163.811 
S.E. 1653.80 1926.58 l 730.43 
GENDER 30667.42 42149.47 30522.97 
S.E. 27169.52 30805.65 17005.47 
MAJPARTY 58046.39j 42440.72 56469.89• 
S.E. 21945.47 60070.88 29995.34 
PCTBLACK -74631.74• -27415.14 -68423.32 
S.E. 44406.35 154770./0 68076.47 
PCTCOLLG 183365.90 308012.60 190402.90 
S.E. 177151.60 4/7184.60 308797 .60 
PUBEMP -1.24 -1.25 - 1.25 
S.E. 1.63 1.65 1.64 
HHIE -239.85 -289.05 -245.04 
S.E. 317.17 387.31 332.51 
lnMEDINC 129398. 10• 112425.70 127830.60· 
S.E. 65981.75 73556.05 68169.50 
1992 -34887.06j -22082.32 -34302.22 
S.E. /6617.70 37262.60 11850.23 
1994 96066.98• 115944.10 96291.54 
S.E. 49731. 71 69877.31 54905.34 
1996 -49287.87 -35207.25 -48003.16 
S.E. 32255.54 62456.08 40515.92 
Constant -691060.90 -434010.70 -670881.30 
S.E. 648442.10 877487 .80 708/43.00 
Number 1511 1511 1511 
F(IS, 49) 30.49 36. 16 22.41 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squand 0. 18 0.18 0.18 
Chutert 50.00 50.00 50.00 
1Instrumenied: oppspend; Instruments : chbegin chcorp chlabor slalftmd 
1Jnstrumented: votemarg; Instruments: opcnprim pcrot92 statfund 
'Inst rumen1ed: votemarg oppspend; Instruments : opcnprim perot92 statftmd chbegin 
chcorp chlabor 
• Significant at the 90% level; 
l Significant at the 95% level 
1 Sil!!ificant at the 99% level 
48 CAMPBELL, LOPEZ, & ROGERS 
after instrumenting for both opponent 's spending and vote mar-
gin in Model 3, ABSDEVIATE is not significantly related to in-
cumbents' re-election expenditures. Thus, our results fail to 
support those of Lopez and Campbell (2004). 
DISCUSSION 
In their survey of the legislator shirking literature, Bender 
and Lott (1996) point to four areas ofrelative consensus regard-
ing legislator voting: (a) legislators almost always represent their 
constituents' interests; (b) when legislators do diverge from con-
stituent interests, the adverse economic effects on constituents 
are trivial ; (c) when legislators do not attempt re-election, their 
attendance rates fall; and (d) even small deviations from consti-
tuent interests quickly leads incumbents to lose re-election. Lo-
pez and Campbell (2004) built on this last result by investigating 
whether incumbents who deviate more frequently or further from 
their constituents' interests tend to increase their total campaign 
expenditure to retain their seats, ceteris paribus . Using data from 
four recent congressional elections and measuring the residuals 
from a regression of constituent characteristics on the legislator's 
vote record, they found incumbents are able to "buy back" some 
deviation through higher re-election campaign expenditure. 
However, to derive their measure of incumbent deviation, 
Lopez and Campbell rely on the widely used but still controver-
sial "residualization" procedure pioneered by Kau and Rubin 
(1979) . To avoid that controversy, we attempted to create a dif-
ferent measure of incumbent deviation based on the ideology 
measures of Berry, et al. (1998). 
Using this new measure of incumbent deviations, we sub-
stantially replicated the empirical program of Lopez and Camp-
bell (2004). However, our findings are substantially different 
from theirs. After controlling for endogeneity with opponent 
spending and victory margin in a typical model of campaign 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
PAYING TO DEVIATE FROM CONSTITUENT INTERESTS 49 
spending, we find that incum-
bents' deviations from consti-
tuent preferences-as 
measured by ABSDEVIATE-
are not significant predictors 
for incumbent expenditure in 
subsequent re-election cam-
paigns. 
There could be numerous 
reasons for this result. Howev-
er, to focus on ABSDE-
VIATE 's failure in the 2SLS 
regression is to ignore its im-
pact on the "first stage" regres-
sions, an impact which has a 
natural interpretation . 
In the VOTEMARG m-
strurnental regression, AB-
SDEVIATE 's coefficient ts 
negative and significant at the 
95% level. Its coefficient re-
gression falls below customary 
levels of significance in the 
OPPSPEND regression. Thus, 
we find that although our 
measure of incumbent devia-
tions is not significantly related 
to incumbents' re-election ex-
penditures, more incumbent 
deviation significantly predicts 
lower vote margins for incum-
bents in their subsequent re-
election bids. 
Table 4 
M~ forV01EMARG & OPPSPEND 
Regression with robust standard errors 
ABSDEVIATE 
S.E. 
AGE 
S.E. 
TE URE 
S.E. 
GE DER 
S.E. 
MAJPARTY 
S.E. 
PCTBLACK 
S.E. 
PCTCOLLG 
S.E. 
PUBEMP 
S.E. 
HH1E 
S.E. 
lnMEDINC 
S.E. 
1992 
S.E. 
1994 
S.E. 
1996 
S.E. 
Constant 
S.E. 
umber 
F(lS, 49) 
Prob>F 
R' 
Clusters 
Modell Model2 
VOTFMARG OPPSPFND 
-0.070f 
0.03 
0.04 
0.08 
0.28f 
0.13 
-0. 17 
2.85 
-9.913l 
1.17 
38.23l 
6.50 
47 .38 
26.36 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.03 
-9.94 
5.23 
4.077f 
l .99 
2.42 
J.61 
8.16l 
2.09 
130.15f 
53.65 
1511.00 
26.57 
0.00 
0.16 
50.00 
118.52 
135.27 
-394 .32 
1468.62 
-4113 .26f 
175/ .14 
7653 .l0f 
32877.50 
36171.61f 
14530.54 
-224434.30l 
51950.60 
155129 .70 
206754./0 
0.42 
1.22 
131.36 
272.24 
27584 .66 
41872 .95 
26972. 16 
16637.88 
96489.60 
21212.4 1 
-21627.53 
16718.96 
-13315 4.90 
434917.40 
1511.00 
12.47 
0.00 
0.07 
50.00 
• Significant at the 90% level; 
1 Significant at the 95% level 
1 Significant at the 99% level. 
VOL. 37 2008 
50 CAMPBELL, LOPEZ, & ROGERS 
To provide further evidence, in Ta-
ble 5 we present estimates of probit 
models of the variable WINNER. To 
include VOTEMARG, OPPSPEND, 
and TOTSPEND, we generate an addi-
tional variable: 
Table S 
Probit Estimates 
(5) SPENDVAR = TOTSSPEND 
OPPSPEND•VOTEMARG 
Model 1 of Table 5 has a log likelihood 
of (-) 46.72 and a "pseudo R-squared" 
of 0.86. The coefficient on SPENDVAR 
is positive and significant at the 99% 
level, arguing for its inclusion in the 
model. Of more interest, the coefficient 
on ABSDEVIATE is again negative and 
significant at the 95% level, implying 
the greater incumbent deviation, as per 
our measure, implies lower likelihood 
of winning re-election. 
These findings imply that incum-
bent deviation does matter, as implied 
by Bender and Lott (1996). Contrary to 
Lopez and Campbell (2004), the in-
cumbent is not able to "buy back" some 
of his deviation in a subsequent elec-
tion bid. Rather, the electorate rewards 
the challenger with a larger vote mar-
gm. 
A serious consideration is whether 
the Lopez and Campbell measure of 
deviation and our current measure of 
deviation-both purport to measure the 
ABSDEVIATE 
S.E. 
SPE DYAR 
S.E. 
AGE 
S.E. 
TENURE 
S.E. 
GE DER 
S.E. 
MAJPARTY 
S.E. 
PCTBLACK 
S.E. 
PCTCOLLG 
S.E. 
PUBEMP 
S.E. 
HHIE 
S.E. 
lnMEDINC 
S.E. 
1992 
S.E. 
1994 
S.E. 
1996 
S.E. 
Constant 
S.E. 
umber 
LR Ch i2(14) 
Prob>Chi 1 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R1 
• Significant at the 90% level 
1 Significanl 01 the 95% )e\'e) 
l Significant nt the !19% Je,·e) 
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Mode l 1 
-0.0 IT 
0.00 
15.39! 
l .79 
o.oi 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.15 
0.49 
-1. 10! 
0.36 
-0.04 
0.88 
-2.38 
3.65 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.0/ 
-0.03 
0.92 
0.32* 
0.39 
0.8 1 
0.42 
0.17 
0.43 
1.36 
8.84 
1206 
55 1.84 
0.00 
-46.72 
0.86 
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same construct-are measuring 
the same phenomena. Without 
recourse to labeling either meas-
ure "ideology" or "legislator 
shirking," both are technically 
constructed as measures of in-
cumbent deviations from consti-
tuent's purported political 
interests. At root, both are con-
structed from adjusted ADA 
scores. However, the correlation 
coefficient between the Lopez 
and Campbell measure and our 
current measure is only 0.049. 
This fact alone casts doubt on the 
assertion that both variables 
measure the same phenomena. To 
further this line of reasoning, we 
present estimates in Table 6, ap-
plying both our measure of devia-
tion, ABSDEVIATE, and a re-
construction of the Lopez and 
Campbell measure, ABSRESID. 
Model 1 of Table 6 confirms 
the Lopez and Campbell (2004) 
result. In Model 2 of Table 6, 
ABSDEVIATE is added to the 
model. The Lopez and Campbell 
result is again confirmed, as is 
the main result of this paper, that 
ABSDEVIATE is not a signifi-
cant predictor of incumbent's re-
election expenditures. 
Table6 
Using Both Measures of Deviation 
Model l Model 2 
TOTSPEND TOTSPEND 
ABSRESID 70.72! 70.80! 
S.E. 20. 79 20. 70 
ABSOEYlATE -0.01 
S.E. 0.17 
OPPSPEND 0.50! 0.50! 
S.E. 0.08 0.08 
VOTEMARG -0.58* 
S.E. 0.35 
MAJPARTY 93.26! 
S.E. 20.89 
GENDER 22.52 
S.E. 28.86 
TENURE 8.05! 
S.E. 1.76 
AGE -2.47j 
S.E. 1.27 
HHIE -0.05 
S.E. 0.32 
PCTBLACK -108.37* 
S.E. 64.80 
PCTCOLLG 15.53 
S.E. 258.50 
lnMEDlNC 137.89j 
S.E. 62.46 
1994 -47.78 
S.E. 16.37 
1996 87.55* 
S.E. 46.31 
1998 -64.42j 
S.E. 29.81 
Constant -939.90 
S.E. 610.24 
Number 1511 
F(IS, 49) 37.67 
Prob>F 0 
R' 0.17 
Clusters 50 
• Significant at the 90% level 
TSigni(icant at the 95% levelt 
Significant at lhe 99% level 
-0.58* 
0.35 
93.27! 
20.80 
22.58 
28.70 
8.05! 
1.75 
-2.47* 
1.27 
-0.05 
0.32 
-108.13* 
64.31 
15.77 
259.02 
137.80j 
62.70 
-47.82j 
16.18 
87.49* 
46.31 
-64.48 
29.83 
-938.52 
614.34 
1511 
35.29 
0 
0.17 
50 
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This implies to us that the underlying construct, incumbent's 
statistical deviations from constituent 's purported interests, by 
any name, is either not sufficiently well-defined or not sufficient-
ly operationalized. Immediately this calls to mind Peltzman 's 
(1984) critiques of Kau and Rubin (1979) that the vector of con-
stituent interests is underspecified, etc. Without further theoreti-
cal development, the most prudent conclusion seems to be 
limited almost to the point of disinterest: the absolute values of 
the residuals of a Kau and Rubin-style regression are significant-
ly and positively related to incumbent 's re-election campaign 
expenditures. The absolute value of a series constructed from 
incumbent's adjusted ADA scores and election returns is not sig-
nificantly related to incumbent's re-election expenditures. 
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